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Although shipping is the most environmentally friendly mode of transportation, the
ship-based emissions may be the last major pollutant to be regulated, especially the
notorious SOx. This situation has begun to change, because the global 0.5% sulphur
cap will be introduced in 2020, and new SECAs are being established in several ports
of China. However, few studies have been conducted to estimate the potential cost of
these regulations on Chinese shipping industry. To fill this research gap, this paper
presents a study about economic implications and regulatory impacts of the sulphur
regulations on Chinese shipping industry, and compares several different compliance
strategies of the regulations. Further, a quantitative analysis is conducted on three
mainstream options (MGO and low sulphur fuel, HFO with scrubber and LNG
propulsion) using the cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) methods. Results have
revealed that there is no universal option for every ship, and the payback time of
HFO with scrubber option may vary from 2.5 to 6 years while the payback time of
LNG propulsion may vary from 2.5 to 10 years depending on different assumptions.
In addition, a qualitative analysis has also been carried out to explicate challenges
and propose reasonable suggestions to Chinese shipping industry and
Administrations. At last, limitations and outlook are provided for future studies.
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Influence of IMO and Chinese Regulations of SOx
on Shipping Industry in China
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and regulatory regime
Indeed, shipping is the most environmental friendly mode of transport when
productive value is taken into consideration, as it transports about 90% of world
trade (IMO, 2015; Ma, 2016). However, the issue of air pollution affects people’s
nerves increasingly. Unlike other direct marine pollution such as oil spills, air
pollution from ships seems indirect and invisible, and its damage to environment is
gradually accumulated and affects man and nature in different areas. Dramatically, it
may somehow not be the cause of current problems, but may result in catastrophes
for the next generation (Konchak & Pascual, 2005). The study conducted by James
Corbett and his colleagues in 2007 indicated that approximately 60,000 people die
prematurely each year because of shipping-related emissions globally (James et al,
2007).
Sulphur oxides or SOx (principally SO2) are one of the major air pollution sources of
shipping industry. They are formed in combustion process by oxidation of sulphur in
marine fuel oil, and then dissolve in the water of the atmosphere and form sulphuric
acid1 which is a major cause of acid rain (Wärtsilä, 2014). Furthermore, the
emissions of SOx may contribute to the formation of secondary inorganic aerosol
1 SO2 + H2O → H2SO3;
SO3 + H2O → H2SO4
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gases and fine particles. According to the third International Maritime Organization
(IMO) greenhouse gas study 2014, from 2007 to 2012, annual emissions of SOx
from international shipping industry amounted to approximately 10.6 million tonnes,
which means approximately 12% of global SO2 emissions are from anthropogenic
sources (IMO, 2015). This is mainly due to the low-grade or high-sulphur marine
fuel oil. Compare with automobile industry, this kind of Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO)
contains about 3,500 times more sulphur than automotive fuels (Keasling, 2008).
Being the specialized agency of the United Nations (UN), with the responsibility for
safety and security at sea and prevention of marine pollution from ships, IMO has
been pursuing the limitation of SOx emissions from ships for years. International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) Annex VI, which
was adopted in 1997 and entered into force on 19 May 2005, is the first international
convention to limit the main air pollutants contained in exhaust gas from ships
including SOx (Regulation 14). After three years’ implantation, Marine Environment
Protection Committee (MEPC) 58 (October 2008) adopted the revised MARPOL
Annex VI which has much more stringent norms to limit the emissions of SOx and
entered into force on 1 July 2010. For the sake of regulation and monitoring, IMO
does not require any numerical limit on SOx emissions, but focuses on the sulfur
content allowed in fuel. Recently, MEPC 70 (October 2016) has made the decision
that the global 0.5% (m/m) sulphur cap for marine fuel will enter into force on 1
January 2020 other than deferred to 2025, which has aroused great controversy in
maritime industry (World Maritime News, 2016).
3
Figure 1-1: Current established and future ECAs all over the world.
Source: DNV GL, 2016a.
Typically, for differentiated and flexible implantation, IMO introduced the concept of
Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECAs) or Emission Control Areas (ECAs), in
which the limitation is much more severe. As presented in Figure 1-1, by far there
have been four existing SECAs: the Baltic Sea ECA, the North Sea ECA, the North
American ECA, and the US Caribbean ECA. The limitation applicable in SECAs has
been reduced to 0.1% (m/m) since 1 January, 2015. In addition, in developed areas
such as European Union (EU), the regulations are even more stringent. The EU
Directive 2005/33/EC stipulated the maximum for allowable sulphur content of fuel
oil used by ships at berth in EU ports was 0.1% (m/m) from January 1, 2010
(Terilowski, 2012). The timetable of sulphur limits from IMO is shown in Figure 1-2.
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Figure 1-2: The timetable of sulphur limitations of IMO.
Source: Wärtsilä, 2014.
China has been a shipping country since ancient times. It covers approximately
3.7 million square miles and 8700-mile-long coastline which is indented by 100 large
and small bays, most of which are ice-free throughout the year. The famous Yangtze
River of China, with a length of 3915 miles, is the longest river in Asia and
the third-longest in the world (China.org, 2010). As for modern China, with the
rapid growth and industrialization over the past thirty years, China overtook Japan
as world’s second largest economy in 2010, and remains on target to take the first
slot from the US between 2020 and 2030 (Malcolm, 2011). As maritime transport is a
derived demand of the trade, the shipping industry of China has therefore
dramatically developed. China (excluding Hong Kong and Macao) owns the world’s
largest number (4960) of and third largest dead-weight tonnage (8.87% of total) of
seagoing merchant vessels of 1,000 gross tons and above in 2016 according to
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2016). Since
2005, the volume of cargo traded through Yangtze Rive has become the biggest of
world’s inland waterway (Marine Science Institute of Chinese Ministry of Transport,
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2013).
In China, the environment problem is severe and complex. China is in a critical
period of the social transformation at present, and the controversy about the priority
between economic growth and environment protection has been debated vigorously.
Yu and Jiang (2008) thought the United States and Europe used a variety of
mechanisms or soft laws to set limitations on the developing world. Christopher
(1993) presented that rather than allowing “free riding” by developing countries,
developed countries should constrain them through “environmental capacity”.
However, the research done by Berkeley Earth in 2015 presented that the observed
air pollution is calculated to contribute to 1.6 million deaths per year in China,
roughly 17% of all deaths in China and the largest number all over the world (Robert
& Richard, 2015).
Anyway, sulphur pollution has long been one of the major environmental issues in
China. According to the statistics provided by Chinese Environment Ministry in 2013,
sulphur emissions from ships account for 8.4% of Chinese total emissions (Chinese
Ministry of Environment, 2014). However, in consideration of its vast inland regions
and the rapidly increasing size of fleets, the pollution situation in ports and coastal
cities are more worrying as shown in Figure 1-3. Take Shenzhen Port as an example,
in 2012 ocean-going vessels discharged about 16,000 tons of SOx, accounting for
65.8% of Shenzhen’s total SOx emissions, making it the largest source of SOx
emissions in the city (Shenzhen MSA, 2014). Another urgent problem is the emission
of inland vessels. There were 147.2 thousand inland vessels by the end of 2016 in
China, accounting for 91.94% of total Chinese ships. As there were no SOx
regulations related to inland vessels before 2016, the annul emissions of SOx were
estimated as 1 million tons over the past decade (Chinese ministry of transport,
6
2016).
Figure 1-3: Annual average SO2 emissions in China.
Source: Robert A. R. & Richard A. M., 2015.
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Chinese government has already realized
the seriousness of the pollution caused by SOx and other shipping emissions. The
Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, and the Bohai-rim Waters have been
designated as Chinese ECAs since 2016. Within these ECAs, there are 11 ports
designated as “key ports”, which are Shanghai, Ningbo-Zhoushan, Suzhou and
Nantong in the Yangtze River Delta; Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Zhuhai in the Pearl
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River Delta; Tianjin, Qinhuangdao, Tangshan and Huanghua in the Bohai-rim Waters.
A five-year program will be implemented step-by-step that aims to reduce SOx
emissions by up to 65 percent by 2020 in these ECAs (Chinese ministry of transport,
2015). Before that, Hong Kong has already attempted to appeal to vessels at berth to
switch to fuel not exceeding 0.5% sulphur content voluntarily by Hong Kong
Shipowners Association and Hong Kong Liner Shipping Association from 2011,
which is called the Fair Winds Charter (Barbara, 2013). Then the mandatory
requirement was introduced in mid-2015. In addition, on August 22, 2016, Chinese
Ministry of Environment issued the Limits and Measurement Methods for exhaust
pollutants from marine compression ignition engines (ChinaⅠ ,Ⅱ ), which was the
first Chinese standard for inland ships and coastal ships (Chinese Ministry of
Environment, 2016).
Table 1-1: The timetable of sulphur limitations of IMO.
Timeline Requirements of fuel oil Comment
From 1 January 2016 If possible, sulphur content of
fuel≤0.5% m/m in designated
ports
Non-compulsory.
From 1 April 2016, key ports in the
Yangtze River Delta permitted to
enforce the regulation.
From 1 October 2016, Shenzhen
Port in the Pearl River Delta ECA
permitted to enforce the regulation.
From 1 January 2017 Sulphur content of fuel≤0.5%
m/m in key ports
Compulsory.
From 1 January 2018 Sulphur content of fuel≤0.5%
m/m in all ports located within
the ECAs.
Compulsory.
From 1 January 2019 Sulphur content of fuel≤0.5%
m/m within the ECAs.
Compulsory.
Towards the end of 2019, there is a
possibility that the requirement will
be tightened to 0.1%, then they
may become formal ECAs of IMO.
Source: Chinese Ministry of Transport, 2016.
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1.2 Aim and Objectives
As few studies have been conducted to estimate the potential cost of these
regulations on shipping industry in China, the aim of this paper is to make
suggestions for Chinese shipping industry towards the coming limitation in 2020, by
analyzing the economic implications and regulatory impacts on Chinese shipping
quantitatively and qualitatively, and comparing the three mainstream methods (MGO
and 0.5% sulphur fuel, HFO with scrubber and LNG propulsion) for controlling SOx
emissions from ships. To reach the aim, the objectives of this paper are indicated as
follows:
a) Review the current IMO and Chinese regulations on SOx management;
b) Summarize the feasible technologies and methods for controlling SOx emissions
from ships;
c) Compare the mainstream compliance strategies and calculate the transport cost of
typical ships using different strategies, then discuss the possible solutions;
d) Identify regulatory impacts on Chinese shipping industry and give proposals to
decision makers.
1.3 Methodology
Several methods are used to achieve these study objectives in this research paper,
including literature review, quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis. The
literature was widely reviewed beforehand, such as IMO documents, international
conventions, Chinese regulations, previous research papers, books and articles from
journals and libraries of DMU as well as WMU. Besides, related information was
also obtained from websites. The quantitative analysis is a comparative analysis that
will be carried out through Cost-effectiveness Analysis (CEA), in order to compare
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the three mainstream compliance strategies of SOx regulations with a focus on cost
estimation and payback time. Moreover, the qualitative analysis pays attention to the
feasibility of solutions provided and make reasonable suggestion based on challenges.
All these analyses are also in the help of information collected during field-study
trips and interview with some shipowners, crew and colleagues in Suzhou port.
1.4 Structure of the paper
This research paper consists of five chapters. Chapter one provides background
information, regulatory regime, objectives and methodologies to be used; Chapter
two widely reviews the compliant options available currently and in the future,
providing a detailed analysis about merit and demerit of each option, particularly the
primary three methods to comply with the 0.5% global cap in 2020 (MGO and 0.5%
sulphur fuel, HFO with scrubber and LNG propulsion). Chapter three concerns a
comparative analysis of the primary options through CEA method to support further
analysis, and a summary of the calculation results. Chapter four deals with a
qualitative method mainly concentrating on the regulatory impacts and challenges on
the Chinese shipping industry. Chapter five discourses final conclusions, and makes
recommendations to different parties relevant to Chinese shipping industry. Besides,
limitations of this paper and outlook for further researches also have been outlined.
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CHAPTER 2
Technologies and methods available for controlling SOx emissions from ships
Because of the existence of ECAs, the practices of SOx reduction have already been
going on for several years. As shipping is a business in essence, the most significant
impact of these practices is additional transport cost. According to Maike (2016)
from Maersk Line, the SOx rules are by far the most costly piece of regulation which
has ever come out of the IMO, the global cap in 2020 may cost the shipping industry
more than $50 billion per year, even based on the presently very low oil prices. The
decision on the cap is in line with an official assessment on fuel availability by a CE
Delft-led consortium. Although some studies have shown that it is still hard to
determine whether the global refining industry will have the capacity to provide
qualified and enough marine fuel by 2020, the shipping industry now has only three
years to decide on their compliance measures.
2.1 Evaluation of available compliance options
By now, there exist several methods and technologies that may be chosen to reduce
sulphur emission for ships. Table 2-1 illustrates eight main methods as well as their
strengths and weaknesses.
Table 2-1 Comparison of different methods for controlling SOx emissions.
Methods/technologies Strengths Weaknesses
Marine Gas Oil (MGO) and
Low sulphur fuel (0.5%
sulphur content)





1. High operating expense
(OPEX) because of the high
price of fuel
2. Price uncertainty in the future
3. Environmental uncertainty
Installation of SOx scrubbers
(HFO)
1. Easy to refuel




old ships 3. Environmental uncertainty
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 1.Cheap in some places
2.Environmental
friendly
3. High scrap value
1. Hard to retrofit on old ships
2. Very high CAPEX
3. Very large space occupation
4. Hard to refuel
Compressed Natural Gas
(CNG) as fuel as fuel
1. Same as LNG
2. Liquid at room
temperature
1. Same as LNG
2. Ultra high CAPEX
Gas-to-Liquid (GTL) as fuel 1. Same as LNG
2. Liquid at room
temperature
1. Same as LNG
2. High energy consumption of
production
Methanol as fuel 1. Achievable both for





2. Higher GHG emissions than
conventional fuels
3. Hard to refuel
Hydrogen as fuel 1.Environmental
friendly
2. Potential option
1. Space occupation even larger
than LNG
2. Hard to refuel











3. Not feasible right now
Source: Compiled by the author based on the studies from references.
Although the methods of hydrogen, battery and nuclear would not be applied to
shipping industry commercially before 2020, because of corresponding weaknesses
and immaturity of technology readiness. They can still provide potential options for
future application through further research and innovation.
LNG, CNG, GTL and methanol are always considered as clean energy. Among them,
LNG technology is quite mature while LNG powered vessels have about 50 years’
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practice in shipping industry without any serious accidents (DNV GL, 2015). As of
October 2016, there were 86 vessels operating using LNG as a fuel and a further 93
vessels on order, doubling the number 3 years ago (DNV GL, 2016b). LNG will
become an important option of alternative energy after 2020. Both CNG
(Compressed Natural Gas) and GTL (Gas-to-Liquid) can be liquid in room
temperature for easier transport. Although they are relatively new compared with
LNG, there are several carriers already in operation now. However, the technologies
of using them as fuel for ships are still immature and the cost may be ultra high in the
near future.
Figure 2-1: Development of LNG-fuelled fleet.
Source: DNV GL, 2015.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the strategy to use methanol as alternative
fuel has already become a reality. The world’s first methanol-powered ferry “Stena
Germanica” was delivered to StenaLine in March, 2016. This ferry operates in the
Baltic Sea SECA, where the limitation of sulphur has been only 0.1% (m/m) since
2015. By using methanol as fuel, it will be able to reduce the emissions of sulphur by
99% than using HFO (IMO, 2016). The methanol fuel system is built mainly of
13
well-known components with mature technologies, and the initial cost and
maintenance cost are relatively lower than those of LNG fuel although the price ratio
is unstable (see Figure 2-2) (IMO, 2016). Currently, the use of methanol in maritime
industry is limited, yet there are already seven methanol carriers on order which will
run on methanol. Along with the accelerated process of practice and study, it could
be an excellent choice for passenger ships and working ships operating in SECAs in
the future. For China, this strategy may be adaptive after the limitation of SOx going
further, as methanol is produced cheaply from coal and only used as a transportation
fuel for cars by now.
Figure 2-2: Comparison of LNG and Methanol prices.
Source: IMO, 2016.
In conclusion, to comply with the IMO and Chinese regulations on SOx emissions,
14
currently the following options are available based on technological level and
economic consideration for Chinese shipping industry:
a) Use of MGO and 0.5% low sulphur fuel
b) Use of HFO with exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS) or SOx scrubbers
c) Use of LNG propulsion
2.2 Feasibility evaluation
1) MGO and 0.5% low sulphur fuel
Recently, with the experiences from the enforcement of SECAs since 2015, MGO
and low sulphur fuel may be the most commonly applied option to comply with
Annex VI of MARPOL while the primary reason is low CAPEX. This option does
not need much retrofit of engine system, as most ships using HFO can switch to
MGO directly. Also, there is no need of extra volume for storage tanks. The only
character to consider is that the viscosity of MGO is lower than that of HFO, so that
MGO may need to be cooled to stay at specified design viscosity levels to prevent
fuel pump wear. In addition, for some ships switching from heated HFO to cooled
MGO, special change-over procedure is needed (Eugene et al, 2015). In contrast, for
long-term use of low sulphur fuel oil and MGO after 2020, ships will decrease
maintenance and may remove fuel heater. Hence this option has minimum risk and
maximum flexibility among all the options.
However, the fuel price of MGO is significantly higher than that of HFO which
means the fuel cost may increase by 50% to 70% (Li, 2016). What is interesting is
that despite the higher demand of MGO after the implementation of SECA rules on 1
January, 2015, the premium MGO prices to HFO continued to decline. And the
ultra-low sulphur fuel oil (ULSFO) was priced about 10% lower than MGO as shown
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in Figure 2-3 (DNV GL, 2016a). This is mainly because of the oil price slump since
June 2014, which made the price difference between HFO and MGO smaller.
However, there are huge uncertainties in which way the oil prices will be headed in
the near future, especially the price of 0.5% low sulphur fuel oil. Study of
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) indicates that the crude oil price will rise to
$70 per barrel while it is around $50 per barrel by now (ICS, 2016).
Figure 2-3: Low sulphur fuel premiums compare with HFO.
Source: DNV GL, 2016a.
Another challenge of this option is that in order to comply with NOx Tier III for
engines installed on or after 1 January 2016 operating in NECAs (the North
American area and the U.S. Caribbean area), a Selective Catalytic Reduction (SCR)
or a Exhaust Gas Recirculation (EGR) is needed when the ship operates on low
sulphur fuel or MGO (Lloyd’s Register, 2016). The additional costs may influence
the shipping companies if their ships have to go to NECAs.
Low sulphur hybrid fuels (lower than 0.5% sulphur) are expected to be available in
2020 to cope with the global cap, as the price is fairly lower than MGO. This new
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low sulphur fuel will try to cover the huge demand in 2020; otherwise the maritime
industry will have to rely on MGO. Indeed, the official study by CE Delft concluded
that global shortages of compliant fuel in 2020 are “improbable”, and refineries have
adequate capacity in even the highest demand scenarios. It is also estimated that the
demand will be 233 million tonnes of marine fuel with sulphur of from 0.1% to 0.5%
in 2020 (CE Delft, 2016). One uncertainty in front of the industry is that as
de-sulphurisation is costly and the initial investments for the devices are enormous,
refineries may choose to postpone these investments and wait for better market
opportunities.
2) HFO with EGCS or SOx scrubbers
The principle of an EGCS or scrubber is using alkaline materials in seawater or
alkaline chemicals like caustic soda (NaOH)2 to neutralize the sulphurous acid
formed by SOx. By removing sulfur from the exhaust, the scrubber also removes
most of the direct sulfate particulate matters (PM) and much of the secondary PM
that is formed with the help of SOx. The first prototype seawater scrubber system for
exhaust gas control on ship was installed in 1991 (ENTEC, 2005). Then this
technology was accepted by IMO as an acceptable alternative method for complying
with SOx emission reduction regulations in 2008 through the revised MARPOL
Annex VI.
There are two kinds of EGCSs, dry systems and wet systems, Currently the wet
systems are dominant as they have been thoroughly practiced and validated (Zhou et
al, 2015). The wet scrubber can be divide into three types: open-loop, closed-loop and
hybrid systems (see Figure 2-4). Open-loop systems use seawater directly and
2 2NaOH + SO2 → Na2SO3+ H2O; Na2SO3 + SO2 + H2O → 2NaHSO3;
NaOH + H2SO4 → NaHSO4 +H2O; 2NaOH+ H2SO4 → Na2SO4+ 2H2O.
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closed-loop systems use wash water mixed with alkalinity chemicals to boost the
alkalinity. Just as the name implies, a hybrid system means it can operate either as an
open-loop or a closed-loop system.
Figure 2-4: The classification of EGCS or SOx scrubbers.
Source: Compiled by the author based on the studies from references.
The main difference between an open-loop system (Figure 2-5) and a closed-loop
system (Figure 2-6) is that the open-loop system needs to release waste water back
into the sea after neutralization; therefore it must meet MARPOL requirements
before being discharged. And the closed-loop system is filled with water which is
recirculated for a period of time; it only need to exchange with clean water to
maintain the cleaning efficiency periodically. One disadvantage of the open-loop
system is that it relies on alkalinity of the seawater on the vessel’s route, and also the
sands and impurities in seawater could influence the cleaning effect (USEPA, 2011).
Moreover, in some ports of Europe and the US, the release of waster water from
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open-loop system is prohibited. For ships operating in those areas or low-alkalinity
areas, a hybrid or closed-loop system is recommended. Another drawback of
open-loop systems is that the power consumption will be higher because of the large
amount of seawater pressed by pumps. However, as the cheaper initial investment,
system simplicity, and no need of consuming caustic soda, the open-loop scrubbers
may still be the better choice under certain circumstances (EGCSA, 2016).
Figure 2-5: Open-loop exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS)
Source: EGCSA, 2016.
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Figure 2-6: Closed-loop exhaust gas cleaning system (EGCS)
Source: EGCSA, 2016.
The main advantage of the scrubber is that cheap HFO can still be used even in
SECAs depending on existing technology. These systems are easy to install as there
is no need for engines to retrofit or replace, and the space occupation is quite small.
After 2020, if the price difference between HFO and low sulphur fuel is high, and
initial cost and maintenance cost prove to be acceptable, installation of scrubbers
may become a widespread option. Another advantage of scrubbers is that the main
different between designed 0.1% and designed 0.5% sulphur content is the amount of
seawater used (open-loop system) or the amount of alkaline chemicals used
(closed-loop system) (DNV GL, 2016a), so that operational modes are flexible for
vessels entering or leaving SECAs.
However, because of the use of HFO, other emissions of exhausts such as NOx and
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PM may cause compliance issues. Scrubbers have little effect on the control of NOx
emissions, so that a SCR or EGR is required for NOx Tier III compliance in NECAs
(Song, 2016). Although scrubbers could help reduce PM emissions to a specific level,
there is no evidence that it will match the coming limitation of PM level in the future.
On the other hand, this option may be unattractive for those ships that rarely sail in
SECAs and with small engine power, as the initial investment is quite high in such a
persistently depressed shipping market by far. CE Delft’s study presented that the
share of ships for which EGCSs are cost-effective increases with the increase of
engine power. Above 20 MW (megawatt), EGCSs are cost-effective for a large share
of ships while below 5 MW, EGCSs are hardly ever cost-effective (see Figure 2-7).
Another huge uncertainty is the price of 0.5% low sulphur fuel after 2020, the
cost-benefit of HFO may be significantly reduced and its availability may be limited
compared to low sulfur fuels, if the supply of low sulphur fuel would be sufficient
and the fuel price would be relatively low.
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Figure 2-7: EGCSs are more cost-effective for ships with larger engines.
Source: CE Delft, 2016.
3) LNG propulsion
With the approach of IMO global 0.5% sulphur cap, the advantages of using LNG as
alternative fuel is becoming increasingly apparent. According to DNV’s report of
Shipping 2020, more than 1 in 10 newly-built ships will be delivered with gas fuelled
engines from 2012 to 2020, and the majority of them will be LNG fuelled ships.
Most of these LNG fuelled ships will use dual fuel diesel engines that can burn any
combination of LNG and marine bunkers (DNV, 2012).
One major advantage that attracts shipowners and policy makers is the tremendous
environmental benefits. Compared to HFO, use of LNG as fuel will reduce the SOx
and PM emissions to nearly zero, and reduce the NOx emission by approximately
85% to 90% in case of low-pressure engines (2 or 4 stroke). Additionally, the CO2
emissions are about 20% lower than HFO because of the lower carbon content (IMO,
2016). By choosing this method, shipowners do not need to worry about further
regulations in the near future which can be considered as an implied benefit.
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Figure 2-8: World oil and gas reserves.
Source: DNV GL, 2015.
Other advantages of this choice are the huge supply and relatively lower price of
LNG to MGO or even LNG to HFO. Figure 2-8 shows the world oil and gas reserves:
Reserve-to-Production ratio for 2009-2013, the gas reserves are no less than the oil
reserves. The reserves remaining at the end of any year are divided by the production
in that year, and the unit is years (DNV GL, 2015). As for the price, unlike the sharp
fluctuations of crude oil price during recent years, the LNG price was
relatively steady since 2009, fluctuating around $3 per million BTU (British Thermal
Unit) in North America (see Figure 2-9) (USEIA, 2017). Further, the historical price
ratio of LNG/HFO and MGO/HFO from 2003 to 2011 in Europe is between 0.5 to
1.5 and 1.5 to 3 relatively (see Figure 2-10) (Danish Maritime Authority, 2012).
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Figure 2-9: The Henry Hun Natural Gas Spot price of last decade.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Agency (USEIA), 2017.
Figure 2-10: Historical price ratio of LNG/HFO and MGO/HFO (Prices are at
European import Hub).
Source: Danish Maritime Authority, 2012.
As for the price projections, CE Delft’s report performed a sensitivity analysis with
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different LNG price projections, defined as case low and case very low in order to
test the robustness of the stated fuel price. In the report, the estimated LNG price
may vary from $361/t to $583/t (see Figure 2-11 and Table 2-2) (CE Delft, 2016).
However, as the existence of liquefaction cost and higher bunkering cost of LNG, the
actual bunker price of LNG is much higher and hard to estimate. Further, the LNG
price differs a lot in different regions of the world because of the pricing mechanisms,






2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
HFO (3% m/m) 521 631 741 679 616 434 252 315 377 422 466
MGO (0.10% m/m) 672 835 997 947 896 674 452 502 552 584 616
LSHFO (>0.50% m/m) 625 772 918 864 809 600 390 444 497
LSHFO (<0.50% m/m) 546 595
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LNG-1 case base 377 292 377 462 523 583
LNG-2 case low 315 249 308 366 405 443
LNG-3 case very low 315 248 300 343 358 361
Figure 2-11, Table 2-2: Fuel price projections and sensitivity LNG price projections.
Source: CE Delft, 2016
As for the disadvantages of LNG propulsion, first of all, whether for newbuilds or
a small number of conversion projects, the CAPEX is ultra high. Subsequently, since
the density of LNG is less than half that of HFO, the volume of LNG tank is
significantly larger than the normal fuel tank. Moreover, these LNG tanks should be
specially designed according to the requirements of International Code for the
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code),
and will occupy the precious cargo space, particularly the container ships. The lost
capacity results in lost revenue which may be regarded as an additional cost
associated with the LNG option. Finally, weaknesses such as the safety investment,
crew training requirements and higher salaries, insufficient LNG infrastructures, etc.
are casting a shadow over the outlook of LNG propulsion.
2.3 Chapter Summary
Different compliance strategies have different advantages and disadvantages. Under
current conditions, three mainstream options (MGO and 0.5% sulphur fuel, HFO
with scrubber and LNG propulsion) are introduced in detail. Besides, their possible
prices after 2020 are discussed according to recent predictions. However, the
introductory analysis is not sufficient to ensure a practical and effective solution for
Chinese shipping industry. A quantitative analysis is required to further compare
these three options, thereby providing compliance recommendations to decision
makers. The following chapters will focus on in-depth analysis.
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CHAPTER 3
Comparative analysis of the three compliance options for Chinese shipping
industry
Indeed, as there has been no real sense of 0.1% sulphur SECAs in China up till now,
for most shipowners, there is no need to install scrubbers on their ships or build new
LNG fuelled vessels immediately. Whereas, with the rapidly approaching of 0.5%
sulphur cap in 2020, they should try to make the right decision soon to occupy a
rather favorable position in the further competition. The issue confronting them is
how to select the right option.
Undoubtedly, financial attractiveness is the key factor for every shipowner as
shipping is commercial. Other factors include the environmental impacts, company
image (e.g., green image, high-tech image), government subsidies, policy orientation,
safety and simple operation and maintenance, etc. As mentioned in Chapter 2, each
option has is own merits and demerits; there is no dominate advantage to let any
option stand out for all vessels in different situations. Table 3-1 illustrates the
respective features of the three strategies from the aspects of cost, environmental
impacts and cargo capacity.
Table 3-1: Comparison of three compliance strategies for controlling SOx emissions.









CAPEX OPEX SOx NOx PM CO2
MGO and 0.5%
sulphur fuel




3 3 2 5 2 4 Slightly
restricted
LNG 5 1 1 1 1 2 Restricted
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b) Numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, represent the degree of cost and environmental impacts, the
small the number, the small (better) the cost or environmental impacts.
Source: Compiled by the author based on the studies from references.
As for cost effectiveness of the three options, there are also many factors and
uncertainties that more or less influence the result of analysis and the feasibility of
any option, whether for retrofits or new builds. For instance, the future fuel prices
especially the 0.5% low sulphur fuel, the length of time operating in ECAs, the
service life and maintenance costs, the scrapping value, the lost capacity of cargo
space, additional requirements of training and certifications, LNG infrastructures on
the route. All of these uncertainties prove that a systematic calculation and analysis
need to be done for the specific ship to help determine the most economical option.
In spite of these challenges and uncertainties, there is still a need to do the simple and
general cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to support the decision makers. CEA is a
form of economic analysis that compares the relative costs and outcomes of different
courses of action. It is an important part of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) which
was introduced by IMO in order to support decision making and formalising the
assessment of new regulations (Skjong, 2002; MSC/Circ.1023, 2002.) The major
difference between CEA and other analysis approaches is that there is no attempt to
monetize benefits. Rather, the focus is entirely on meeting a predetermined standard
or goal (Dixon et al, 2001). As there are so many uncertainties with insufficient data,
only the cost will be paid attention to rather than benefit, the CEA method is
appropriate to undertake in this analysis.
28
3.1 Assumptions
Assumptions can simplify the complex world and help focus our thinking on the
essence of the problem (Mankiw, 2012). This cost comparison is mainly for the
Chinese shipping industry to comply with the global cap in 2020 as well as Chinese
SOx regulations, so that all the assumptions depend on the basis of Chinese reality.
The results of this analysis will illustrate the present value (PV) of total costs and the
payback time of different options, both for retrofits and new builds. Furthermore,
using MGO and 0.5% low sulphur fuel will be regarded as the base case as the initial
investment is quite low. Note that the conclusions will vary depending on the
assumptions that are made.
The PV of costs will be estimated for the year of 2020, the annul operation cost will
be estimated over the first 10 years (from 2020 to 2030). As beyond 10 years, the
components of the installed equipment may need replacement and fuel price is
uncertain. There may be some technological progresses that will totally change the
energy structure, such as other alternative fuel options introduced in Chapter 2.
Besides, as a high-risk industry like shipping industry, the loan rate is generally
higher than conventional industries. During this decade, the Nominal interest rate3 is
estimated at 8%, and the Inflation rate is estimated at 2%, therefore the Real interest
rate4 is 6%, according to the formula (Mankiw, 2012):
Real interest rate = Nominal interest rate－Inflation rate.
Furthermore, as shipping industry is driven by international trade, and most
international trade including fuel, is settle in dollars, the currency unit of this analysis
3 The interest rate that measures the change in currency amounts.
4 The interest rate corrected for inflation.
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is dollar ($). In order to simplify the calculation process, the fuel price should be
assumed. Although Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) tries to
steer the industry away from over supply recently, the US does not seem to cut down
the production of shale oil and shale gas, crude oil price is considered to fluctuate
from $50 to $60 per barrel after 2020 in the analysis. According to the Bunkerworld
Index (BWI), which is a weighted daily index made up of 20 key bunkering ports
worldwide (Bunkerworld, 2017; see Figures 3-1 and 3-2), this analysis set the HFO
price at $300/t as the demand of HFO may significantly reduce, and MGO price at
$500/t as MGO may have a short-term excess demand after 2020.
Figure 3-1: HFO 380 price fluctuation in the last year.
Source: BWI, 2017.
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Figure 3-2: MGO (0.1% sulphur) price fluctuation in the last year.
Source: BWI, 2017.
The price of LNG is more complex because of the regional price variance as well as
liquefaction cost and bunkering cost. The price also varies from different ship types
due to the amount of LNG needed. Moreover, the LNG price will follow the
fluctuation of oil price and the policies of LNG exporters. This analysis assumes the
Henry Hub LNG price will be average $4/mmbtu from 2020 to 2030, which means
about $190/t. However, adding the price variance, liquefaction cost and bunkering
cost, the free on board (FOB) LNG price for an oceangoing ship is supposed to be
$350/t. As for the 0.5% low sulphur fuel, due to the huge uncertainty of price after
2020, the price range is set from the lower side of 20% or $60 above the HFO price
($360/t) and the upper side of 50% or $150 above the HFO price ($450/t).
3.2 Cost-effectiveness analysis of retrofit for a midsize vessel
To make it more representative, this analysis chooses the typical Aframax oil tanker
31
to illustrate, as midsize tanker is similar to midsize bulk carrier in size and cost.
Aframax is around 100,000 dwt, and it is widely operated in North America. As
China has started to import crude oil from the US, this kind of tanker may be suitable
for this route. The rated power of this ship is set at 13500 kw (such as the
WÄRTSILÄ 7RT-Flex58T main engine) (Zhang, 2012), and built in 2012. The length
of time operating in ECAs can be set at 25% after 2020. According to Oil & Tanker
Trades Outlook by Clarkson Research, ships of this size cost an average of 49.2
tonnes fuel per day on the speed of 14.9 knots in 2015 (Clarkson Research, 2015).
For convenience of calculations, the fuel consumption of HFO is assumed as 50t/day.
The total cost can be divided into investment cost, annual operating cost and fuel
cost.
3.2.1 Investment cost
For each compliance strategy, the investment cost is different. It can also be
influenced by the size of the propulsion plant. Based on the study presented by DNV
GL in 2015 and ITF/OECD (International Transport Forum at Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development) in 2016, the indicative investment costs
are indicated in Table 3-2.
Table 3-2: Indicative investment costs of optional compliance strategies.
Compliance strategy Retrofit. Engine installed
before 1 January 2016
New build. Engine
installed after 1 January
2016 (SCR for Tier III)
MGO and 0.5% sulphur fuel
(engine conversion)
$180000 $140000 + $75/kW
HFO with scrubber (scrubber) $350/kW $450/kW
LNG dual fuel (tanks etc.) $800/kW $1000/kW
Source: DNV GL, 2015; ITF/OECD, 2016.
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Hence, for this Aframax tanker, the relatively investment costs are shown in Table
3-3:
Table 3-3: Investment cost of optional compliance strategies for this Aframax tanker.
Compliance strategy Investment cost
MGO and 0.5% sulphur fuel
(engine conversion)
$0.18 million
HFO and scrubber (scrubber) $4.725 million
LNG dual fuel (tanks etc.) $10.8 million
Source: Calculated by author.
3.2.2 Operating cost
The actual operating cost includes the manning cost, repair and maintenance cost and
insurance cost (Ma, 2016), but this analysis focused on the operating and
maintenance cost where the vast majority of differences lie in.
1) MGO and 0.5% sulphur fuel
The annual maintenance cost for this method is the lowest of the three propulsion
options. Because burning MGO alleviates the need for operating fuel purifiers and
the fuel heating system. However as this option requires to switch between MGO and
0.5% sulphur fuel, this operation may add additional of the maintenance cost. The
annual maintenance cost used in this analysis is $0.9 per MW/hr.
2) HFO with scrubber
The maintenance cost for the HFO propulsion design is higher than that of MGO.
The larger purifiers and fuel heating system required for HFO operation are assumed
to add an additional 30% to the total engine maintenance cost (USEPA, 2011).
Beside, as the HFO is a dirtier fuel than MGO and compliant fuel which will also
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increase the maintenance cost, the annual maintenance cost used in this analysis is
$1.3 per MW/hr.
According to the study done by Herbert Engineering, the annual operating cost for
closed loop wet scrubbers is estimated to be $14.25 per MW/hr and $3.25 per MW/hr
for open loop wet scrubbers (Eugene et al, 2015). Assuming this ship installs the
hybrid scrubber, then the operating cost is supposed to be $6 per MW/hr. Hence the
total annul operation cost is $7.3 per MW/hr.
3) LNG
The maintenance and operating costs for LNG fuelled vessel is presently unknown
because of lack of samples. However, as the devices and components are expensive,
the manning cost is also higher than conventional ships. The annual maintenance cost
used in this analysis is $1.4 per MW/hr.
In conclusion, for this Aframax tanker, the operating costs can be seen in Table 3-4:
Table 3-4: Operating cost of optional compliance strategies for this Aframax tanker.
Compliance strategy Operating cost
MGO and 0.5% sulphur fuel $0.106 million
HFO with scrubber $0.863 million
LNG dual fuel $0.166 million
Source: Calculated by author.
3.2.3 Fuel cost
The energy content varies with different fuel oil qualities especially the specific
composition of the LNG. Thus a correction factor based on the lower heating value
(LHV) is introduced to take into account these differences. HFO is set as the base
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case and its correction factor is 1 (see Table 3-5:).
Table 3-5: LHV and relative correction factors of optional compliance strategies for
this Aframax tanker.
Alternative fuel Lower heating value Correction factor
MGO+0.5% sulphur fuel 42,700 kJ/kg of MGO 1.02
HFO 40,500 kJ/kg 1
HFO with scrubber 40,500 kJ/kg 0.95
LNG 49,000 kJ/kg 1.2
Source: Eugene et al, 2015.
MGO has a LHV of 42,700 kJ/kg, while HFO has a LHV of 40,500 kJ/kg (5% lower
than that of MGO). The LHV of 0.5% sulphur fuel is unknown and somewhere
in between MGO and HFO. For this Aframax tanker, the correction factor of the first
option is set at 1.02. As a scrubber system consumes 1% to 2% of the engine power,
the correction factor of the second option is set at 0.95. The LHV of LNG is diverse,
this analysis use the general 49,000 kJ/kg (Eugene et al, 2015), and the correction
factor is estimated at 1.2. As the fuel consumption of HFO is assumed as 50t/day, the
fuel costs can be calculated as Table 3-6:
Table 3-6: Fuel costs of optional compliance strategies for this Aframax tanker.





$7.067 million ~ $8.275
million
HFO with scrubber $300 $5.763 million
LNG dual fuel $350 $5.323 million
Source: Calculated by author.
3.2.4 Total cost
In the end, the total cost can be easily estimated (see Table 3-7), as the Finance Rate
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is assumed as 6%. The comparison curve can also be drawn in Figure 3-3. Compared
with the use of MGO and compliant fuel, the payback time of HFO with scrubber
strategy may range from 2.5 to 10 years, while the payback time of LNG propulsion
may range from 4 to 7.5 years.
Table 3-7: (Present Value) PV of total costs for 10 years for this Aframax tanker (unit:
million USD)










2020 0.180 0.180 4.725 10.800
2021 7.353 8.561 11.351 16.289
2022 14.120 16.468 17.602 21.467
2023 20.504 23.927 23.499 26.352
2024 26.527 30.964 29.062 30.961
2025 32.208 37.602 34.311 35.309
2026 37.568 43.865 39.262 39.411
2027 42.625 49.773 43.933 43.280
2028 47.395 55.347 48.340 46.931
2029 51.896 60.605 52.497 50.375
2030 56.142 65.566 56.419 53.623
Source: Calculated by author.
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Figure 3-3: (Present Value) PV of total costs for 10 years for this Aframax tanker
(unit: million USD).
Source: Draw by author.
3.3 Cost-effectiveness analysis of a midsize to-be-built vessel
To illustrate, a typical Panamax container ship, which is around 3000 TEU, is chosen
as the midsize vessel to be built. The rate power of this ship is set at 18000 kW, and
the average speed is 20.7 knots, the fuel consumption of HFO is assumed as 70t/day
(Clarkson Research, 2014). This ship is supposed to be built in 2020 and operated
from China to Europe and the US, the length of time operating in SECAs can be set
at 40% as there may be more SECAs in these areas. Furthermore, the length of time
operating in NECAs will be set at 10%, so that for the compliance strategies exclude
LNG, a SCR or EGR is required.
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The investment cost of SCR is higher than that of EGR, while the operating cost of
SCR is lower (Kong et al, 2015). This analysis uses SCR case to illustrate. According
to the study done by the USEPA, for this 18000 kW main engine, the Aqueous Urea
Cost per hour is $76 which is the main operating cost. Added with other repair and
maintenance costs, the total operating cost for a SCR is set at $120 when operating in
NECAs (USEPA, 2009). Notice that the reduction of cargo space of container ship of
retrofit from HFO to LNG may be about 2% to 4% (DNV GL, 2015). As this lost
revenue is hard to estimate as ships can hardly be fully loaded in such a
depressed market, it is neglected in this analysis. Table 3-8 presents the different
costs of optional strategies of this ship:
Table 3-8: Different costs of optional compliance strategies for this Panamax
container.
Compliance strategy Investment cost Operating cost Annual fuel cost
MGO and 0.5% sulphur fuel
(engine conversion,SCR)
$1.49 million $0.247 million $10.629 million ~
$12.009 million
HFO and scrubber (scrubber
and SCR)
$8.1 million $1.256 million $8.068 million
LNG dual fuel (tanks etc.) $18 million $0.166 million $7.452 million
Source: Calculated by author.
After all, the total costs can be easily estimated (see Table 3-9), and the comparison
curve is drawn in Figure 3-10. Compared with the use of MGO and compliant fuel,
the payback time of HFO with scrubber option may range from 2.5 to 5 years, while
the payback time of LNG propulsion may range from 4 to 6 years.
Table 3-9: (Present Value) PV of total costs for 10 years for this Panamax container
(unit: million USD).
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2020 1.490 1.490 8.100 18.000
2021 12.366 13.746 17.424 25.618
2022 22.626 25.308 26.220 32.805
2023 32.306 36.216 34.519 39.585
2024 41.438 46.506 42.347 45.981
2025 50.052 56.214 49.733 52.015
2026 58.180 65.373 56.700 57.708
2027 65.847 74.013 63.273 63.078
2028 73.080 82.164 69.474 68.145
2029 79.904 89.853 75.324 72.924
2030 86.341 97.108 80.843 77.433
Source: Calculated by author.
Figure 3-4: (Present Value) PV of total costs for 10 years for this Panamax container
(unit: million USD).
Source: Draw by author.
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3.4 Significance of the comparative analysis
Indeed, from the results of the comparative analysis, we can conclude that there is
no silver bullet unfortunately, which means it is still difficult to argue which option
will always be the wisest for shipowners. Nevertheless, the results of this analysis
can reach the following conclusions, and help provide some suggestions to support
the decision makes.
Initially, the cost of each strategy depends on the fuel price to a great extent.
Typically, the payback time of HFO with scrubber and LNG vary according to the oil
price particularly the compliant fuel price. When the low sulphur fuel price is at the
upper side ($450/t), the payback time of HFO with scrubber can be only 2.5 years
whether for retrofits or new builds; also, the payback time of LNG will be 4 years
whether for retrofits or new builds. When the price differences become smaller, the
payback times will increase accordingly. In addition, it appears to be more fuel-price
sensitive for retrofitting existing vessels than a new build, and the option of HFO
with scrubber than LNG. For example, the longest payback time of HFO with
scrubber for retrofitting can be 10 years, which is 4 times longer than the shortest
payback time. Hence, if the fuel oil price is low like recent three years, and the vessel
age is more than 15 years, keep using the MGO and compliance fuel may be
advisable. However, if the compliance fuel price seems to be kept at high levels for a
long time probably because of a surge in demands, political events or another oil
crisis, etc., it may be wise for shipowners to take action, and then scrubbers or LNG
propulsion seem to be good candidates.
Secondly, the length of time operating in ECAs also influences the calculation results.
When ships operate more time in SECAs, in this analysis from 25% to 40%, the
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longest payback time can be reduced both for HFO with scrubber (from 10 years to 5
years) and LNG propulsion (from 7.5 years to 6 years). The main reason is that the
fuel cost of MGO when ship operating in SECAs is much higher than the alternative
fuels. Therefore, shipowners should determine the length of time operating in SECAs
as well as NECAs before making a decision. For those ships which have a high
degree of exposure in North American and Europe, the LNG fuelled ship may be
sensible.
Thirdly, fuel consumption of ship is another important factor to determine the
payback time. In the analysis, as the container ship (20.7 knots) operates faster than
the oil tanker (14.9 knots ), the daily fuel consumption of container (70t/day) is also
larger than that of oil tanker (50t/day). As a result, the payback time becomes shorter
for the latter two options. Therefore, fast vessels like containers, passenger ships, or
high-powered vessels like tugs, icebreakers, are more suitable to install scrubbers or
be converted into LNG fuelled ships, given their large amount of fuel consumption.
In addition, the uncertainty about future policies will also influence the analysis
results. In the analysis of the Panamax container, as the NOx Tier III requirements
are introduced, the initial investment and annul operating cost for the low sulphur
fuel strategy and HFO with scrubber strategy will increase accordingly. Then the
advantage of LNG will appear, and the payback time of LNG propulsion will be
reduced correspondingly. In other words, the LNG option appears to be policy
sensitive. If there are further environmental limitations or regulations, the payback
time of LNG may be shorter. Although there has been widespread strengthening
trend of air pollution regulation all over the world, especially the IMO, the future
policies remain elusive. It is noteworthy that just during the writing of this paper on
June 1, 2017, the US President Donald Trump decided to pull the United States out
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of the Paris Agreement which is a landmark global pact to fight climate change. “Any
regulation that’s outdated, unnecessary, bad for workers or contrary to the national
interest will be scrapped and scrapped completely,” as Mr Trump said (British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 2017). This action added huge uncertainties to the
future policy and regulations about air pollution.
Last but not least, the reality is much more complicated than assumed in the analyses,
and it is dynamic and unpredictable. For example, because of the existence of
opportunity cost5, the results of payback time may be inaccurate. The decision
makers should comprehensively consider every factor; solely relying on the results of
any analysis or model is unadvisable. As for this comparative analysis, the
assumptions and results will be entirely different if it is done in 2020 or by another
scholar. Shipowners should rely on their own judgment in line with their own
conditions rather than unquestioningly believing any research.
3.5 Chapter Summary
The comparative analysis through CEA method in this chapter is critical for this
research paper, although the results do not give the definitive conclusions to decision
makers. The sample ships selected are representative, and the payback time of HFO
with scrubbers and LNG propulsion is impressive when the oil price is relatively
high. This chapter also discusses the factors and effect degrees of the solutions, in
consideration of these factors, shipowners can make the right decision according to
their own situations. However, as these analyses are mainly focused on the micro
level, analysis at macro level will be introduced in the following chapter.
5 The cost of something is what you give up to get it.
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CHAPTER 4
Regulatory impacts and challenges on Chinese shipping industry
The regulatory impacts on Chinese shipping industry lie in many aspects, some
positive and some negative. The enforcement challenges for the industry, Chinese
government and China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) are great.
Nevertheless, as the stricter regulations of SOx in the future will not delay for anyone,
it is better for the whole industry to recognize and prepare to deal with these impacts
and challenges, and turn them into opportunities. Note that as shipping is an
international industry, these discusses will be from the international perspective and
with a focus on China.
4.1 Regulatory impacts
4.1.1 Transport cost
The increase in maritime transport cost is the most significant impact of these
regulations regardless of what compliance strategy to select. Nowadays, the shipping
companies are struggling nearby the balance profit and loss line as market is in the
unprecedented downturn. Every regulation may be the last straw that breaks the
camel’s back for some of them. In August, 2016, Hanjin Shipping filed for
bankruptcy protection, which is by far the largest container shipping bankruptcy in
history (BBC, 2016). Even the market leader Maersk Line reported first loss (loss of
$ 376 million in 2016) since financial crisis of 2008, due to a average of 19% decline
in freight rates compared to 2015 (A.P. Moller - Maersk, 2017). However, the
shipping sector of China seems a little better thanks to the Chinese impressive
economic performance and increasing volume of trade in recent years. Port
throughput of China was steadily growing at a compound annual rate of 6.2%, rising
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from 10.04 billion tonnes in 2011 to 12.75 billion tonnes in 2015. The total
throughput is expected to reach 17.04 billion tonnes by 2020 (Chinese Ministry of
Transport, 2016). However, quite a few shipping companies and shipbuilding
companies still suffer heavy losses.
In fact, the nature of shipping as an international business has been used as an excuse
or manoeuvre to delay environmental actions for many years (Christer, 2016). And
the negative externality6 (air pollution) of shipping industry is an important culprit
of shipping oversupply. As society bears the cost of air pollution (external cost), the
market quantity of shipping transport is larger than the optimum quantity (see Figure
4-1). From now on, the wonderful times seem to be over. The study by OECD
showed that global sulphur cap of 0.50% could increase shipping cost between 20%
and 85%, depending on the assumptions regarding speed, fuel price and ship size.
Furthermore, for container shipping industry, the cost rise will be more serious as the
annual cost may rise from $5 billion to $30 billion (OECD, 2016).
6 The impact of one person’s actions on the well-being of a bystander.
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Figure 4-1: Pollution and the Social optimum.
Source: Mankiw, 2012.
Thus the problem is how to deal with the increased maritime transport costs. From 1
January 2015, Maersk Line introduced new Low Sulphur Surcharge (LSS) for cargo
owners in response to environmental regulation and has affected all trades with
origin and/or destination in ECAs (Maersk Line, 2015). This may be one
recommended reaction of Chinese shipping companies, but they have to take the risk
of customer churn in such an intensely competitive market. Another choice is slow
steaming particularly for high speed vessels operating in ECAs, as fuel consumption
increases exponentially with an increase of vessel speed. Further, it is advisable to
sail even slower within ECAs than out of ECAs except LNG fuelled ships. The third
attempt may be re-routing, for spending as little time as possible in SECAs and
NECAs. For example, one ship may change the destination port from Suzhou port
(one of the key ports in the Yangtze River Delta) to Jiangyin port nearby. Hence these
regulations not merely reduce the SOx emissions for key ports, but also provide
opportunities for the development of “backward” ports around them.
4.1.2 Fleet structure
Vessel oversupply or overcapacity has been gripped transport market for years now,
and this problem seems to have no end point because most people made wrong
decisions in their appreciation of the cycles and disruptive influences of shipping
industry (Michael, 2016). Now there appears to be a silver lining in the dark cloud
over this industry, with the limitation of SOx emission in 2020 as well as the entry
into force of Ballast Water Management (BWM) Convention on 8 September, 2017,
as these regulations may help improve the speed of demolition of old ships. Before
that shipowners might have no incentive to retrofit an old ship into LNG fuelled or
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install a scrubber when considering the payback time. Moreover, as slow steaming
implies that more vessels are needed to sustain the same volume of cargo, these
regulatory impacts may alleviate the situation of overcapacity.
Nevertheless, there will be more development opportunities for clean energy vessels
such as LNG propulsion and methanol propulsion, especially for the new builds, as
mentioned in Chapter 2 (10% of total vessels to be built from 2012 to 2020). The
proportion of this kind of ships will increase, which will also provide great market
opportunities for high-tech shipyards and energy suppliers. Besides, another possible
compliance option at berth is using the shore side electricity, so that the auxiliary
engines can stop generating electricity. The development of onshore power
infrastructures may boom in the near future in China.
Another concern is that the increase in maritime costs may lead to a shift of
transportation mode. In recent years, Chinese high-speed railway is developing
rapidly with governments’ support. For example, the upgraded agreement about
railway project (from Kashgar to Gwadar and Karachi) between China and Pakistan
has been signed on 14 May, 2017, which is a key project of the “One Belt, One
Road” initiative (News China, 2017). However, maritime transport still has
irreplaceable advantages compared with other transport modes for carrying
low-value commodities, and this situation will never change as there are few real
substitutes.
4.1.3 Environmental impacts
The effect of emission reduction has proved to be remarkable within SECAs since
the introduction of 0.1% limitation in 2015. Measurements at the Port of Gothenburg
showed that SOx emissions have fallen by 80% since the introduction of the 0.10%
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requirement in 2015 (Mellqvist et al, 2016). The USEPA presented that the North
American ECA will save more than 14,000 lives annually by 2020, and improve the
respiratory health of about 5 million people. Although this ECA will cost $3.2 billion
by 2020, the health-related benefits can be from $47 billion to $110 billion (USEPA,
2011). The high benefit-cost ratio indicates that there remains huge regulatory space
for further limitations.
Besides, the positive side-effects of SOx regulations deserve to be mentioned. The
reduction of PM in SECAs estimated to be around 65-77% (ENTEC, 2010) and
80-85% (Swedish Maritime Administration, 2009) according to their studies.
Generally, PM particulates are one of the most concerned pollutant on land as they
can adversely affect human health and also have impacts on climate and precipitation.
Moreover, acidification and eutrophication will also be slightly reduced. However,
the reduction of CO2 needs further studies as it depends on what compliance strategy
to choose. As stated in Chapter 2, the use of MGO and LNG will help CO2 reduction
while the operation of scrubbers, SCRs and EGRs will increase the emissions of
greenhouse gases to a certain degree. Environmental and Engineering Consultancy
(ENTEC) (2010) estimated that an all vessels using MGO and compliant fuel by
2020 would lead to a significant CO2 reduction of almost 1.5 million tonnes, whereas
an all vessels using wet scrubbers would lead to an increase of 0.6 million tonnes of
CO2 .
4.2 Challenges
4.2.1 Undersupply of compliant fuel after 2020
The first challenge lies in the possibility of under capacity of refinery industry. Based
on the study of International Energy Agency (IEA) at OECD, there will be an
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undersupply of refinery capacity for low sulphur fuels of 2 million barrels per day in
2021, compared with the situation in 2015 when there was a net global refinery
supply of 0.5 million barrels per day (OECD/IEA, 2016) (see Figure 4-2).
Figure 4-2: Refinery capacity for compliant fuel in 2021.
Source: OECD/IEA, 2016.
Note: green means positive supply, purple means undersupply; the left bar indicates
the capacity in 2015, and the right bar indicates the capacity in 2021.
On the demand side, considering with the financial hardship for shipping companies
to make profits recently, there will be less attraction for them to spend massive initial
investments in scrubbers or LNG fuelled vessels. The compliant option of MGO with
low sulphur fuel may be the overriding option in 2020. The same situation may
happen on the supply side, as refinery industry are also suffering from loss of profit
because of weak oil prices. The investment of desulfurization equipment may be cut
down. Hence, the undersupply of refinery capacity may be even severe, which will
result in the rise of compliant fuel price and the negative impact on the
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implementation of sulphur reduction regulations.
4.2.2 Barriers for developing LNG fuelled vessels
Indeed, the technology of LNG propulsion is mature enough; however there are still
many barriers to operate this kind of ship. First of all, the extremely high CAPEX
prevented a majority of players entering this market. Shipowners have difficulty
estimating the benefits of LNG fuelled vessels as the information on the effectiveness
of technologies and designs is not easily quantifiable (Gençsü & Hino, 2015). On this
condition, a relatively conservative strategy (switch fuel or scrubber) would be the
better choice to mitigate the risk. Moreover, the plunging oil price will also make this
choice less attractive.
On the other hand, insufficient infrastructures of LNG in China is hampering this
industry’s progress. To date the most common LNG bunkering method is still Truck
to Ship (TTS), while the volumes are reasonably small at up to approximately 22
tonnes (DNV GL, 2014). There are only five large-scale LNG bunkering facilities for
shipping in China by 2016, which are in Nanjing, Wuhu, Yichang, Chongqing of the
Yangtze River and Wuzhou of the Pearl River (Pan, 2016). A lack of experience and
clear guidelines for the review of potential risks made government more cautious in
approving LNG infrastructures. Typically, there is no incentive for capital to invest in
these unprofitable facilities as the demand of LNG fuelled ship is relatively weak in
China.
In addition, there exists a significant regulatory gap for bunkering and LNG
infrastructure operation. Legal gaps and harmonisation gaps of different countries
have seriously limited the development of LNG fuelled ships and LNG
infrastructures for years. Furthermore, the regulatory gaps and lack of transparency
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also exist for scrubbers, such as the limitation of open-loop scrubbers in different
areas, the standards of type approval.
4.2.3 Enforcement challenges
Effective enforcement is the primary guarantee of successful implementation of SOx
regulations, without which those violators would enjoy an unfair competitive
advantage as SOx rules are the most costly piece of regulation. For the enforcement
of the global sulphur cap after 2020, numerous challenges and uncertainties need to
be resolved.
The most powerful enforcement mechanism of current IMO regime is Flag State
Control (FSC) and Port State Control (PSC). Yet the existence of flag of convenience
(FOC) has distorted part of the mechanism. Shipowners tend to prefer shipping
registries that practice limited enforcement of the regulation, and then the regulatory
responsibility largely lies on the port states. However, the inevitable limitation of
PSC is that port states are only be able to enforce in their coastal waters. What about
high seas?
Then the challenge goes to the technical aspect. The major issue is how to detect the
non-compliance outside territorial waters. The current detection measures, such as
sniffers install on the bridges or carried by planes and drones, are costly and
impossible on high seas. Other measures like oil samples (see Figure 4-3) and bunker
delivery notes which are notoriously for cheating, are insufficient to prove the
compliance on high seas (OECD, 2016). Currently, the only certainty is that HFO is
prohibited to be carried (except as cargo) by international ships after 2020, unless the
scrubber strategy is adopted (Li, 2014). However, for those ships using scrubbers, it
is difficult to determine if the scrubbers were operating correctly all the time.
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Non-compliant operators may switch them off and solely operate by HFO on high
seas.
Figure 4-3: Oil samples taken by Taicang MSA in Yangtze River Delta in 2016.
Source: Taicang MSA, 2016.
Additionally, the sanction gap is another enforcement challenge. In 2015, 315 cases
(around 5%) of non-compliance with the sulphur directive in SECAs were reported
to the European Maritime Safety Agency in 2015, only a very limited number of
them lead to a sanction and the penalties never exceed the cost saving by
non-compliance (Bunkerworld, 2016). In China, after one year’s implementation of
SECA in Taicang port, part of the key port —— Suzhou port, there is no sanction
given. As a result, it is doomed to form a gigantic question mark before the
introduction of further regulations about sanction (Taicang MSA, 2016).
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4.3 Chapter Summary
There regulatory impacts on Chinese shipping industry are discussed through
transport cost, fleet structure and environment impacts. The conclusion is that
advantages of regulations outweigh their disadvantages for shipping industry and
society, although the shipping cost may significantly increase after 2020. Moreover,
the challenges and uncertainties for Chinese shipping industry are great, which lie in
compliant fuel supply, LNG industry and enforcement of MSA. The relevant
industries, governments and China MSA should take steps to prepare the coming
regulations. However, the great opportunities can also be found in these challenges.




The global limitation of sulphur dropping from 3.5% to 0.5% overnight would be
very likely to lead a period of distorted transport and fuel market. It requires every
link cooperates well, from IMO to Administrations, and from shipbuilding industry
to refining industry. In fact, as there remain so many challenges and uncertainties, it
would be surprising if the transition happens smoothly. Keeping up to date with
international and domestic environmental legislation is challenging, shipowners have
to choose the suitable options for their ships before 2020.
The IMO regulations and Chinese regulations related to SOx reduction have been
discussed in detail as well as the hazards to environment and human health. Besides,
the advantages and disadvantages about three mainstream options have also been
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analyzed. The following conclusions can be drawn:
a) When considering the retrofit of an Aframax tanker, the payback time of HFO
with scrubber option may vary from 2.5 to 5 years, while the payback time of LNG
propulsion may vary from 4 to 6 years. As for a Panamax container to be built, the
payback time of HFO with scrubber option may vary from 2.5 to 10 years, while the
payback time of LNG propulsion may vary from 4 to 7.5 years.
b) There is no dominate strategy for every ship.
c) For old vessels, if the fuel oil price is relatively low, keep using the MGO and
compliance fuel may be advisable. For ships which have a high degree of exposure in
SECAs, the LNG fuelled ship may be sensible. Fast vessels or high-powered vessels
are more suitable to install scrubbers or be converted into LNG fuelled ships, given
their large amount of fuel consumption.
d) The transport cost of ship, fleet structure and air pollution emission will be
influenced by the SOx regulations from various aspects.
e) Huge challenges such as undersupply of low sulphur fuel, barriers for LNG fuelled
ships and regulatory gap, cast a shadow over the implementation of global SOx
limitation.
f) Advantages of SOx regulations outweigh their disadvantages for shipping industry
and society.
5.2 Recommendations
The economic impacts, environmental impacts and regulatory impacts of the
mandatory global sulphur gap and Chinese stricter SECA regulations in 2020 will be
profound and lasting, and there are only 2.5 years left for Chinese shipping industry
to be prepared. It must be pointed out that compliance with these regulations not
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merely means cost and challenges, but also opportunities in fiercely competitive
market. Chinese government, related industries and China MSA should make full
preparations for the regulations, as well as take the opportunity to make Chinese
shipping industry more “green”. Here some proposals are offered to different bodies
in China.
1) Government
Powerful governments play a key role in the economic development of China.
Although it is a double-edged sword, here positive side is embodied in. In legal
aspect, national regulatory and legal system need to be established to meet the SOx
regulations, the development of Chinese SECAs should also keep in pace with the
international regulations. Further, governments should encourage the use of
environmental techniques, and speed up the introduction of clean and renewable
fuels to meet the explosive demand. Besides, great supports shall be given to the
refinery industry, scrubber industry and LNG industry in China. In finance, economic
instruments such as directional rate cut for shipping industry, fuel subsidies,
subsidies for scrubbers or clean energy ships, and emission charges can be used in
combinations.
Currently, it is a tremendous opportunity for China to win more international
discourse right about environmental protection. As China desires to take a larger role
in global affairs, the implementation of Silk Road Economic Belt and the
21st-century Maritime Silk Road or Belt and Road Initiative heavily rely on maritime
transportation. Further, after the US left the Paris Agreement, China became the most
important partner of EU on environmental and emission reduction aspect. The
cooperation on saving energy and protecting the environment will be strengthened.
As is well-known, European countries hold a leading position in these areas. For
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instance, by now most of the LNG-powered ships are Norwegian (DNV GL, 2016b).
There are lots of technologies and advanced ideas that China could learn from.
2) Shipping industry
The ship is capital intensive and sensitive to the cost. For most shipping companies,
compliance simply means cost. According to the comparative analysis in Chapter 3,
shipowners should not be overhasty to make decisions. They need continual attention
to their cash flow, the fuel prices, and government policies about different options.
They should focus on the development about cutting-edge technologies in SOx
reduction, as science and technology constitute the primary productive force,
technological progress may totally change the choice of compliance options.
For refinery industry and scrubber industry, it is better to take a longer view as a
huge market opportunity is coming. Technology investment and capital investment
should be enhanced to grab market share in the future, in spite of the short-term loss.
Note that the potential of scrubber industry has gradually caught Chinese scholars’
attention. The representative of the fifth session of the twelfth National People’s
Congress (NPC), former principal of DMU, professor Wang Zhuwen just proposed a
proposal about scrubber industry supportive policy during the session in March 2017
(Dong & Shi, 2017). Besides, if it is feasible, the development of shore power may
be a little ahead of current demand in some ports of China, thereby popularizing the
use of shore power.
As for LNG industry, The 13th Five-Year (from 2015 to 2020) Plan for natural gas
development has already been issued by National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) as well as Bureau of Energy (BOE). This plan aims to improve
the proportion of primary energy consumption of LNG from 5.9% in 2015 to
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8.3%~10% in 2020, and supports the development of LNG fuelled ships in inland
waters and coastal areas (NDRC & BOE, 2017). Taking it as an opportunity, the
LNG bunkering industry should comprehensively consider the supply and bunkering
demand, port infrastructures and navigation conditions, then develop enough LNG
infrastructures to support the promotion of marine LNG fuel.
3) Enforcement of MSA
Enforcement and monitoring should cover the entire world to ensure fair competition.
For China MSA, the PSC is especially crucial for enforcement of international
vessels and the FSC is also crucial for national ships. To begin with, as there remain
many practical problems to be solved, it is necessary to set guidelines combining
Chinese reality. Further, the officer training program about the latest regulations is
recommended as PSC and FSC officers’ professional quality directly determines the
quality of inspection. Moreover, the responsibility of “burden of proof” may be
shifted to the ship from MSA currently to improve the enforceability, which means




Initially, the CEA method used in the paper has its own limitations; the benefits of
the regulations have not be estimated. In addition, the data used in analysis are
mainly assumed or predicted based on practice as there is a lack of statistics and
certainty, and the time to prepare this research paper is limited. A certain degree of
uncertainty and inaccuracy exist, which could affect the conclusion. Subsequently,
this paper does not specify too many technical details of different compliance
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strategies which are also important for readers to evaluate the feasibility of these
strategies. Finally, once again, decision makers could never solely rely on the results
of this paper, as the reality is not exactly the case.
2) Further research
Further research is necessary to improve the compliance performance and promote
competitiveness for Chinese shipping industry. Future research directions are
suggested as follows:
a) A large number of sample data are needed to add to the comparative analysis, and
more factors such as lost revenue of LNG fuelled ship because of the lost cargo
capacity, are required to quantify.
b) A Cost-benefit Analysis (CBA) should be carried out to estimate the
environmental and social benefits of the SOx regulations, which can also help the
government set the further regulations.
c) More studies on the enforcement aspect may be carried out to support the China
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